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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
BAILEY BIRD, MIDTOWN AUTO 
PARTS, STEVEN SURREY, and 
THE ATHENIAN RESTAURANT, 
Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
vs. 
OLAF THEODORE STEVENSEN, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 16647 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
This is an action to determine whether Stevensen 
has the power under a written lease and pursuant to a 
previous lower court judgment to arrange parking on the 
leasehold property and to erect a fence on his own property. 
The written lease giving rise to this action 
was executed in 1961 when Stevensen originally leased 
the parking area and access thereto from respondent Bailey 
Bird who reserved 26 parking stalls on the leasehold 
property for himself and other of his tenants. 
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
This case was tried to the court which held 
that Stevensen did not have the power to rearrange the 
parking configuration and to erect a fence on his own 
property notwithstanding provisions of the lease and 
rulings of a prior court decision to the contrary. The 
lower court also held that respondents had standing to 
sue even though there was no testimony or document 
introduced to show proper standing. Further, the Court pro-
hibited certain Mt. Fuel Supply Co. employees from using 
the leasehold property even though such employees were 
patrons of Stevensen. The lower court also dismissed 
Stevensen's counterclaim even though the court had 
ordered during trial and on previous agreement of counsel 
to reserve the counterclaim to a future proceeding. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Stevensen seeks a reversal of the lower court's 
determination that Stevensen does not have the power to 
arrange the parking or move the accessway from his own 
property to the leasehold property. In the alternative 
Stevensen seeks a reversal of the lower court's deter-
mination that respondents have standing to sue and an 
order directing the lower court to dismiss respondent's 
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case. Stevensen also seeks a reversal of the court's 
judgment that his counterclaim be dismissed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. In 1961 Respondent Bird and Appellant 
Stevensen entered into a lease of the upper two floors 
of the premises located at 251 and 253 East 200 South, 
Salt Lake City, Utah, the parking area to the rear of the 
building at said address 10.84 feet wide to the east 
of such buildings (the alley way is also known as Goddard 
Court). See plat attached hereto as Exhibit "A". 
2. The lease between Stevensen and Bird, 
(Exhibit "P-1") provides in pertinent part as follows: 
(a) Paragraph 5 of the lease on page 4 
grants Stevensen the right to grade and black-
top the parking area and to mark and qesignate 
the same for the parking of motor vehicles. 
Paragraph 5 also reserves the first 26 parking 
stalls which can be entered on the leasehold 
property for Bird and his tenants. 
(b) Paragraph 7 provides as follows: 
Lessee shall have the right during 
the term of this lease or any extension 
thereof, to relocate the accessway to the 
rear of Lessors' buildings from its present 
location, Goddard Court, to any other 
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convenient location, provided only that 
Lessee shall at all times make available 
a suitable and adequate access to the rear 
of Lessors' building and shall keep a lane 
of traffic available for smooth and 
efficient inflow and outflow of traffic 
to the ramp at the rear of Lessors' 
buildings . • . Lessee shall so arrange 
the parking area as to not unnecessarily 
interfere with the efficient and proper 
use of the loading facilities as now estab-
lished at the rear of Lessors' buildings. 
(c) Paragraph 10 of the lease provides as 
follows: 
Lessors convenant that Lessees shall 
have the quiet enjoyment of the premises 
demised herein and shall have the right to, 
at Lessee's own expense, construct fences 
or other suitable boundary markers to limit 
the parking area . . . 
3. Stevensen had previously acquired the 
Lorenzo Smith & Sons property just east of Goddard Court 
to facilitate expansion of his athletic club facilities 
which included a right of way over Goddard Court. (T. 90, 
98; Defendant's Exhibit D-18, page 1, paragraphs 7 and 8). 
See plat attached as Exhibit "A". 
4. Since execution of the lease Stevensen has 
used portions of the Smith property and a small portion 
of the Bird leasehold property for athletic club facilities 
and has used the remaining portion of the Smith property 
and most of the Bird leasehold property for various parking 
arrangements as needed or required by various circumstances 
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existing in the area from time to time. (T. 27, 46, 
112, 113). 
5. As the downtown business area grew and 
construction of improvements on real property limited the 
availability of parking in the immediate area, disputes 
over parking locations between Stevensen, Bird, Bird's 
tenants and their patrons grew to the point where such 
disputes were a regular occurrence jeopardizing persons 
and property in the area. (T. 57, 58, 92, 94, 95). 
6. Parking problems persisted notwithstanding 
appellant's efforts to control the situation. As a result 
of these problems, two tenants of the lessor, Mike and 
Steve Katsanevas, sued appellant to establish their right 
to certain of the 26 parking stalls reserved for the 
lessor under the 1961 lease. 
7. The court in the Katsanevas action recognized 
the Katsanevases right to some of the 26 reserved parking 
stalls and ordered the appellant to make such available to 
them, but did not determine the physical location of such 
stalls or Stevensen's power to rearrange their location. 
(Katsanevas v. Stevensen, Civil No. 226232, judgment p. 2, 
paragraph 1) . 
8. Appellant Stevensen thereafter sued the 
lessor (Bird) for a determination of his rights under the 
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lease. In that action, Stevensen v. Bird, Civil No. 243475, 
the court concluded that "the lease does not grant 
defendants (Bird) any right or interest in the Smith 
property (property Stevensen had purchased from Smith), 
(p. 4, paragrah 6 (a) of Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law in Stevensen v. Bird, Civil No. 243475), and held that 
1. Plaintiffs (Stevensen) are entitled 
to and are hereby granted declaratory judgment 
declaring the meaning of the lease between 
plaintiffs and defendants to grant plaintiffs 
the right to rearrange the parking configuration 
and also to move all parking from the Smith 
property at the rear of lessors' building so 
long as plaintiffs comply with the other 
provisions of the lease between the parties. 
2. The lease between the parties authorizes 
plaintiffs to relocate the accessway extending 
from Second South to the rear of defendants' 
building to any convenient location including its 
original location in the confines of Goddard 
Court so long as plaintiffs comply with the 
other provisions of the lease between the parties. 
3. The lease between the parties authorizes 
plaintiffs to erect fences which limit and define 
the parking areas and access thereto so long as 
plaintiffs comply with the other provisions of 
the lease between the parties. 
(Judgment in the case of Stevensen v. Bird, Supra, at pages 
1 and 2). 
9. Pursuant to the provisions of the lease and 
said declaratory judgment appellant erected a fence on his 
own property line east of Goddard Court, rearranged the 
parking configuration so that lessor had the requisite 
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stalls, and relocated the accessway over Goddard Court. 
(T. 99-100). 
10. As a result of appellant's actions, respondents 
brought this suit to force appellant to rearrange the 
parking to a configuration on both the leasehold property 
and appellant's own property, to remove the fence from 
appellant's own property, and to relocate the accessway 
over appellant's property rather than Goddard Court. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN 
FAILING TO RECOGNIZE THAT DEFENDANT'S 
RIGHTS UNDER THE BIRD-STEVENSEN LEASE 
WERE ADJUDICATED IN A PRIOR LAWSUIT 
AND ARE RES JUDICATA TO THE PLAINTIFFS 
IN THIS ACTION, AND IN ITS ULTIMATE 
CONSTRUCTION OF STEVENSEN'S RIGHTS 
UNDER THAT LEASE. 
It has long been the rule that the final judg-
ment of a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive 
between parties and their privies in a subsequent action 
involving the same subject matter. Dillard v. McKnight, 
34 C.2d 209, 209 P.2d 387 (1949). Parties are in privity 
if there is a mutual or successive relationship to some 
property right, or such identification in interest with 
one person or another as to represent the same legal 
right therein. Tanner v. Bacon, 136 P.2d 957 (Utah 1943). 
Because respondents Midtown Auto Parts, the Church of 
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Scientology, and The Athenian Restaurant are all 
lessees of Bird, they succeed to the rights and limitations 
of Bird in the Stevensen and Bird lease. Bird's tenants' 
are therefore in privity with Bird and any adjudication 
of the Bird-Stevensen lease is necessarily an adjudication 
of their interest in that lease and the rights and 
limitations that grow out of such lease. Indeed, defense 
counsel recognizes such. (See T. 8 7) • 
By declaratory judgment in Stevensen v. Bird, 
Supra, the Court construed the Stevensen-Bird lease as 
giving Stevensen the following authority: 
1. Plaintiffs are entitled to and are 
hereby granted declaratory judgment declaring 
the meaning of the lease between plaintiffs and 
defendants to grant plaintiffs the right to 
rearrange the parking configuration and also to 
move all parking from the Smith property to the 
rear of lessor's building so long as plaintiffs 
comply with the other provisions of the lease 
between the parties. 
2. The lease between the parties authorizes 
plaintiff to relocate the accessway extending 
from Second South to the rear of defendant's 
building to any convenient location including 
the original location within the confines of 
Goddard Court so long as the plaintiffs comply 
with the other provisions of the lease between 
the parties. 
3. The lease between the parties authorizes 
the plaintiff to erect fences which limit and 
define the parking areas and access thereto so 
long as plaintiffs comply with the other 
provisions of the lease between the parties. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-9-
(Judgment in the case of Stevensen v. Bird, Civil No. 
243475, at pages 1 and 2). The court also held that 
Bird had no right in Stevensen's separate property. 
(Conclusions of Law, paragraph 6). 
Notwithstanding this adjudication of ~tevensen's 
rights under the Bird-Stevensen lease, the court below 
permanently enjoined appellant from erecting fences on 
his own property line and ordered him to return the 
parking configuration to that existing immediately prior 
to erection of the new fence on Stevensen's property. The 
judgment of the court below is obviously inconsistent 
with the Stevensen v. Bird resolution of the identical issues. 
Because Bird's tenants are in privity with Bird on the lease, 
the lower court clearly erred in not recognizing that the 
issues resolved in Stevensen v. Bird are res judicata to 
the parties in this action. 
It is clear that respondent Bird in this case 
is attempting to effectuate a horizontal appeal of an 
issue resolved in a prior lawsuit. Bird cannot in this 
action get a redetermination of Stevensen's rights under 
the 1961 lease. Such a determination has already been made 
by a court of competent jurisdiction and an appeal on the 
issues there resolved can only be taken from that court. 
Consequently, this court should reverse the judgment of the 
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lower court purporting to redetermine Stevensen's rights 
under the 1961 lease and in his own separate property. 
Not only did the lower court err in failing 
to hold the issues here in dispute as res judicata to 
the respondents, but its construction of the lease was 
contrary to established legal principles. 
It is commonly accepted that a lease must be 
construed with reference to the intentions of the parties. 
Powerine v. Russell's, Inc., 135 P.2d 906 (1943). In 
finding the intent of the parties the terms of the lease, 
however expressed, if unambiguous, are to control the 
construction and operation of the lease. 51 CJS, Landlord 
Tenants, § 232(2). Consequently, the clear and unambiguous 
language of the lease should have controlled the lower 
court's construction of the agreement in this case. 
In clear and unambiguous language the 1961 lease 
grants Stevensen the right to rearrange the parking con-
figurationon leasehold property and to erect fences to 
facilitate management of the parking area. Paragraph 5 
of the lease permits Stevensen to blacktop the leasehold 
and mark it for parking so long as an adequate access is 
maintained and 26 parking stalls are reserved for the lessor. 
Paragraph 7 grants Stevensen the right to relocate the 
accessway to any convenient location, and paragraph 10 gives 
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Stevensen the "right to erect fences and other suitable 
boundary markers to limit the parking area." 
The lower court's judgment is patently incon-
sistent with the express terms of the agreement. By 
ordering Stevensen to remove the fence on his property 
and enjoining him from erecting similar fences in the 
future (Bird v. Stevensen, Judgment p. 5, paragraph 1) 
the court not only affected property not covered by the 
lease, but effectively read paragraph 10 out of the lease. 
Furthermore, by requiring Stevensen to rearrange the 
parking and accessways to a previous configuration the 
court completely nullified the effect of paragraphs 5 and 
7 of the lease. 
Additionally, the obvious purpose for Stevensens 
entering the 1961 lease was to utilize the leasehold 
property in the conduct of his adjoining b~siness. Not-
withstanding such a purpose, the lower court's judgment 
erroneously restrained Stevensen from allowing Mountain 
Fuel employees to use the leasehold property irrespective 
of whether or not they are on the premises as patrons of 
Stevensen. 
Because the language of the Bird-Stevensen 
lease is clear and unambiguous with respect to Stevensen's 
rights thereunder, the lower court erred in failing to 
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enforce the lease by its express terms and in construing 
the agreement inconsistently with its clear language. 
POINT II. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN 
HOLDING THAT RESPONDENTS HAD STANDING TO 
BRING THE PRESENT ACTION. 
It is widely recognized that a party seeking 
relief must show a clear legal or equitable right and a 
well grounded fear of immediate invasion of that right 
to bring suit. State Ex Rel Hays v. Wilson, 17 Wash. 2d 
670, 137 P.2d 105 (1943}. When suing on a prior judgment, 
therefore, a party must demonstrate that it is owner of 
the judgment either by title appearing on the record or by 
some formal transfer. If a party can demonstrate no such 
interest in the prior judgment it cannot maintain suit on 
the judgment. 50 CJS, Judgments, § 857. Thus, in Data 
Processing Financial and General Corp. v. IBM Corp., 430 
F.2d 1277 (8th Cir. 1970}, a nonparty to a prior suit could 
not bring an action asserting defendant's violation of the 
prior consent decree, and in Prusa v. Hejduk, 238 P.2d 304 
(Okl. 1951}, the heirs of a deceased judgment creditor 
could not maintain an action on decedent's judgment because 
that right had succeeded to the personal representatives. 
Respondents' cause of action in this case is 
essentially an action to enforce the judgment in Katsanevas 
v. Stevensen, Supra. Respondents have failed, however, to 
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present any evidence that they were parties to the 
Katsanevas action or that Katsanevas has assigned to 
them any rights in that judgment. Indeed, none of the 
respondents had any part in the Katsanevas action. 
Consequently, respondents do not have standing to sue on 
the judgment and the lower court erred in failing to 
dismiss the complaint. 
Additionally, Rule 17 of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure requires that every action be prosecuted 
in the name of the real party in interest. A real party 
in interest is one who owns the right being enforced 
and is in a position to discharge the defendant from 
liability asserted in suit. State Farm Mutual Automobile 
Insurance Co. v. Foundation Reserve Insurance Co., 78 N.M. 
780, 427 P.2d 662 (1967). Only Mike and Steve Katsanevas 
have such an interest in the Katsanevas judgment that they 
could alter defendant's liability thereunder. It is clear, 
therefore, that the Katsanevases are the only real parties 
in interest and without them as plaintiffs, the present 
action cannot be maintained. 
POINT III. THE COURT'S DETERMINATION THAT 
DEFENDANT STEVENSEN DID NOT SHOW SUFFICIENT 
CAUSE TO ERECT A FENCE AND REARRANGE THE 
PARKING CONFIGURATION WAS ERRONEOUS AND CONTRARY 
TO THE WEIGHT OF EVIDENCE. 
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The lower court in its Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law found that Stevensen changed the 
parking configuration without sufficient cause thus 
violating the court's order entered in the case of 
Katsanevas v. Stevensen. The evidence presented to the 
Court below is to the contrary. 
Under the Bird-Stevensen lease, Stevensen is to 
provide 26 parking stalls on the leasehold property for 
Bird and his tenants. (Defendant Exhibit "18"). It was, 
therefore, incumbent upon Mr. Stevensen to control the 
parking facility so that Stevensen's patrons did not 
deprive Bird or his tenants of their rights under the lease. 
Inspite of Mr. Stevensen's efforts to regulate the parking 
facility, the evidence at trial demonstrates that parking 
conditions were intolerable prior to erection of the 
fence on Stevensen's property. (T. 91). Patrons of 
Bird's tenants constantly parked in Stevensen's stalls, 
and Stevensen's patrons ofter parked in the stalls reserved 
for Bird and his tenants. (T. 38, 48, 57). 
The situation caused much anxiety and dismay 
to Mr. Stevensen and his employees. Mr. Stevensen was 
often threatened for asking patrons of Bird's tenants to 
remove their cars from his stalls. (T. 94, 95). Likewise, 
Mr. Kerr, one of Stevensen's employees, was constantly 
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harrassed for patroling the parking lot, and on occasion 
was the subject of particularly violent threats. (T. 57, 
58). As a result of these difficult parking conditions, 
many of Stevensen's guards and subordinates left his employ. 
Respondents did not object to the untenable parking 
arrangement because they accepted no responsibility to 
control the parking and because without a separation 
barrier their patrons had use of Stevensen's parking stalls. 
(T. 30, 47-50, 93). 
Because of these intolerable parking conditions, 
and to better facilitate management of the lot, Stevensen 
erected a fence on his property to separate the parking of 
Bird and his tenants from that of his own. Separation of 
the accessways necessitated erection of a fence and rearrange-
ment of the parking configuration. The rearrangement 
does not deprive Bird or his tenants of any of the 
26 parking stalls reserved for Bird in the 1961 lease, 
it only changes their location. Each relocated stall is 
8'6" wide, consistent with the Stevensen v. Bird order, 
and the rearrangement is consistent in all other respects 
with the particulars required by the lease and prior court 
orders. (T. 98). Since making these modifications the 
parking problems referred to above have subsided considerably. 
Patrons of Bird's tenants generally park on the west side 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-16-
of the fence now and Stevensen's patrons park on the east 
side. (T. 59, 115). 
Plaintiff's contention that the present parking 
configuration is inconvenient is not sufficient to over-
come defendant's overwhelming evidence indicating that the 
new configuration resolves the parking problems and 
complies in whole with previous court orders. The 
realligned accessway is 10.84 feet wide, the original width 
of Goddard Court, and (T. 99), sufficiently wide for 
use by any truck complying with the 8 foot Utah width 
limitation. Indeed, the evidence indicates that delivery 
vans, a large garbage truck, and a large linen truck 
negotiate the accessway almost daily. (T. 60, 61, 69-70, 
85, 106). Mr. Kerr, an experienced truck driver, testified 
that he could take a tractor with a 26' trailor down the 
accessway, turn around behind Bird's building, and then 
exit again. (T. 63-64). 
In light of this and other evidence submitted 
at trial, it is clear that Mr. Stevensen had extreme good 
cause to erect the fence and rearrange the parking con-
figuration, and that such action is consistent in whole 
with prior court orders. Defendant respectfully submits 
that the lower court erred in finding otherwise. 
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POINT IV. THE LOWER COURT ERRED BECAUSE 
ITS ORDER EXPANDED THE RIGHTS OF THE RESPONDENTS 
TO INCLUDE RIGHTS IN STEVENSEN'S PROPERTY NOT 
COVERED BY THE LEASE. 
Prior to execution of the Stevensen-Bird lease 
in 1961, and at all times subsequent thereto, Stevensen 
has owned property adjoining Goddard Court on the east 
(Goddard Court being 10.84 foot right of way running 
north and south directly east of Bird's bu~lding, see 
plaintiff's Exhibit "11"), and a 1/2 interest in the 
10.84 foot right of way over Goddard Court. (Defendant's 
Exhibit "18", pp. 1-2; T. 90). By lease agreement dated 
November 21, 1961, Stevensen acquired from Bird the other 
1/2 interest in the right of way over Goddard Court. 
(T. 90, 106-108). Neither the 1961 lease nor any other 
document grants plaintiff Bird any interest in defendant 
Stevensen's adjoining property. 
Furthermore, the court in Stevensen v. Bird, stated 
in its Conclusion of Law that, "The lease does not grant 
defendants (Bird) any right or interest in the Smith 
property (property Stevensen purchased from Smith)." 
(p. 4, paragraph 6(a) of Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law in the case of Stevensen v. Bird, Supra). Indeed, 
the judgment of that court specifically recognized that 
Bird had no interest in Stevensen's property by permitting 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-18-
Stevensen to remove all parking and accessways from his 
own property and relocate them on the leasehold property. 
(p. 1, paragraph 1 of Judgment in the case of Stevensen v. 
Bird, Supra.). Neither can it be argued that the Court in 
Katsanevas v. Stevensen granted Bird or his tenants any 
rights in Stevensen's own property. The order in Katsanevas 
was concerned solely with Stevensen's alleged encroachment 
on the Katsanevas parking stalls covered in the lease, not 
with the physical location of the stalls. {Katsanevas v. 
Stevensen, Civil No. 226232, order dated March 21, 1975 
and July 1, 1975). 
It is hornbook law that a lessee cannot acquire 
any greater rights in the leasehold property than are held 
by the lessor. Smith v. Woolsey, 137 N.E.2d 632 (Ohio Appls. 
1955). Bird is the only respondent in this action in 
contractual privity with Stevensen. The plaintiff tenants 
of Bird, therefore, cannot succeed to any greater rights 
in the Stevensen-Bird lease than plaintiff Bird possesses. 
Consequently, because Bird has no rights in Stevensen's 
property by the lease, none of the other respondents have 
any such right by the lease. 
Notwithstanding respondents' lack of interest in 
Stevensen's adjoining property, the court below ordered 
Stevensen to remove the fence located completely on his 
own property (Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
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Judgment, p. 5, T. 99-107), and to rearrange the 
to its previous configuration, thereby mandating 
Stevensen to utilize his own property for Bird's parking 
and accessway. (See judgment p. 5 and Exhibit "A" to the 
judgment; defendant's Exhibit "19"). 
The lower court has gone far beyond merely 
construing the Bird-Stevensen lease or enforcing a prior 
judgment. By requiring Stevensen to remove his fence 
and rearrange the parking configuration the lower court 
has impliedly granted respondents a right to Stevensen's 
property not heretofore vested in them. In doing so, the 
lower court erred and should be reversed as a matter of 
law. 
POINT V. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DIS-
MISSING THE DEFENDANT'S COUNTERCLAIM WITH 
PREJUDICE AFTER STIPULATION OF THE PARTIES 
AND ORDER OF THE COURT ITSELF DEFERRING 
TRIAL OF THE COUNTERCLAIM FOR ANOTHER HEARING. 
Prior to trial of the instant case, the court 
and counsel for both parties, in chambers, agreed to 
defer trial of Stevensen's counterclaim to a future date. 
The stipulation was confirmed at trial and preserved 
in the record as follows: 
The Court: . the question involved --
involving damages and those raised by the 
counterclaim, I suppose, can be reserved --
deferred until another hearing, is that correct, 
Mr. Smay? 
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Mr. Smay: That is correct, your Honor. 
The Court: Mr. Neider? 
Mr. Neider: That is correct, your Honor. 
(T. 2) • 
The court's judgment, however, dismissed Steven-
sen's counterclaim with prejudice. Inclusion of the order 
dismissing the counterclaim in the judgment is clearly a 
clerical error. Appellant objected to the error when 
opposing counsel submitted the proposed judgment, but 
to no avail. Counsel for appellant would have sought 
correction of the error pursuant to Rule 60(a) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure except that the judgment 
provided for injunctive relief within five (5) days thereby 
necessitating an instant appeal. Consequently, the error 
should be corrected by this court reversing the lower court's 
judgment dismissing Stevensen's counterclaim. 
CONCLUSION 
The lower court's order recognizing respondents' 
standing to sue should be reversed and the suit dismissed 
because no respondent was a party to the order which they 
seek to enforce nor do they have any legal or eauitable 
interest therein. If the Supreme Court finds for the 
respondent on the standing issue, the judgment of the lower 
court ordering appellant to remove the subject fence and 
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rearrange the parking to its previous configuration 
should be reversed and judgment entered for the appellant 
for any of the following reasons: 
1. Appellant's rights respecting erection of 
fences and rearrangement of parking configuration on the 
subject premises were decided in Stevensen v. Bird, Civil 
No. 243475 and are res judicata to respondents. 
2. The lower court erroneously construed 
the lease contrary to terms which clearly and unambiguously 
grant Stevensen the right to rearrange parking configuration 
and accessways and to erect fences. 
3. The lower court's verdict was premised on a 
finding that appellants did not have sufficient cause to 
rearrange the parking which finding is contrary to the 
evidence. 
4. The lower court's order goes beyond respondents' 
rights under the lease and any previous court order, and 
grants to them rights in appellant Stevensen's property 
which are non-existent. 
Additionally, the lower court's judgment 
dismissing appellant's counterclaims should be reversed 
because the court itself ordered deferral of hearing 
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on the counterclaim pursuant to agreement of counsel 
for both parties. 
Respectfully submitted this 30th day of 
January, 1980. 
WATKINS & FABER 
£~ ,:;. ,a,,= 
WAt'TER P. FABER, Jw.'° 
MICHAEL A. NEIDER 
BARRE G. BURGON 
606 Newhouse Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant 
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